Hikmat al-Hijri’s Force Faces Pressure in Suwayda
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Hikmat al-Hijri’s Force Faces Pressure in Suwayda

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The so-called National Guard, a coalition of Druze armed factions that controls much of Suwayda, is under unprecedented pressure amid internal divisions and cracks in the political and social foundations of its power. 

Since the start of 2026, security incidents have surged in National Guard-held areas of the southwestern governorate, including assassinations and other criminal activity such as drug smuggling. These reached a climax in early June with a dispute between prominent groups affiliated with the Guard over the escape of kidnapped Syrians from detention centers under its control, allegedly with inside help. The detainees, mostly from Daraa governorate, had been detained following clashes between local factions in Suwayda and tribal forces in mid-2025, which had led to the intervention by government forces. 

By June, the growing insecurity had pushed dozens of families to leave the province, heading to Rif Dimashq in search of better security and economic conditions—as well as access to education for their children, as National Guard-affiliated groups had prevented Suwayda students from traveling to Damascus to take their university exams. 

Several factors have contributed to the decline of the National Guard’s clout in Suwayda, including social and political factors as well as increased regional pressures: 

   Eroding Political Power: Right from the outset, with its establishment in August last year, the National Guard has failed to win unanimous support in Suwayda. The unrest that preceded its formation, including armed clashes and violations against local residents, helped it gain a degree of implicit public support. However, subsequent developments have damaged its political standing within the governorate. Most prominent are the rumors that it receives security, military, and financial support from Israel, reports that have strengthened the positions of the Guard’s opponents in Suwayda. 

   Eroding Social Power: A number of practices attributed to the National Guard have fueled a decline in its popular support. These include imposing restrictions on the movement of some residents and university students, as well as sensitive incidents such as the case of Sheikh Raed al-Matni, whose death in National Guard custody sparked accusations its personnel had tortured and killed him. This damaged the force’s image in Suwayda and weakened its claim that it protects the local community. 

   Eroding National Legitimacy: Druze elder Hikmat al-Hijri, the National Guard’s religious leader, has persistently promoted independence for Suwayda, under the name “Jabal al-Bashan.” This has proved counterproductive and stoked growing opposition, in a governorate with a century-old nationalist movement with roots in resistance to the French occupation after World War I. This camp holds its Syrian national identity dear, and rejects separatist projects or the creation of political entities outside the framework of the state. 

   Narrowing Operating Space in the Region: Drug smuggling networks are active in areas under National Guard control, primarily targeting Jordanian territory. This has prompted the Royal Jordanian Air Force to carry out several strikes against traffickers, most recently in early May. Furthermore, Amman has adopted an approach based on strengthening the central government’s presence in the governorate, exemplified by its sponsorship of the tripartite roadmap in August 2025. This has further limited the National Guard’s room for maneuver, linking its domestic future to broader regional balances. 

The factors outlined above indicate that the National Guard is facing a decline in several of the sources of its influence simultaneously, in parallel with a narrowing of its regional operating space. That said, it still maintains security control across most of the governorate, benefiting from its continued security relationship with Israel and the absence of alternative arrangements that could altering the status quo. Israel shows no sign of changing its stance toward this relationship, especially given the failure of its negotiations with Damascus to reach a security agreement that would limit Israeli interference in the Syrian conflict  

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