UN Secretary-General António Guterres began his first visit to Damascus on July 25, at the invitation of the Syrian government. He was received by President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, then met government ministers and officials, representatives of civil society organizations, women’s groups, and representatives of Syria’s various confessional groups. He had been set to visit the headquarters of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Israeli-occupied Golan, but this was canceled over scheduling issues.
In a statement, the UN said Guterres would use the visit to reaffirm the world body’s commitment to supporting the Syrian government and people during this critical moment in the country’s history, as well as to emphasize the importance of respecting Syria’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.
With government officials, Guterres was expected to discuss humanitarian issues including early recovery and reconstruction programs, as well as progress on transitional justice, the work of international commissions of inquiry into human rights violations, the operations of Syria’s missing persons commission, and the progress of committees and teams investigating the elimination of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program. In his other meetings, he was to address issues such as social cohesion, governance, civic space, and inclusivity regarding women and the various components of Syrian society.
Conversely, there was no indication that the visit would resolve the key outstanding issue between the Syrian government and the UN—the nature and future of the latter’s political role in Syria—despite the inclusion of UN Political Affairs chief Rosemary DiCarlo in the delegation. Damascus continues to oppose the appointment of a new envoy to succeed Geir Pedersen, and rejects the relocation of the envoy’s office from Geneva to Damascus.
Its opposition stems from several factors:
• The government’s lack of confidence in the UN’s ability to play a constructive role, and its fear of a return to the international wrangling that pervaded the Security Council throughout the conflict—dynamics that sabotaged the UN’s efforts to achieve a political solution.
• The view that the transition took place through military means, rather than the political means stipulated in Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015)—and that the parties to that resolution effectively no longer exist, meaning there is no justification for continuing the UN mission based on that resolution.
• The government’s tendency to view itself as fully sovereign in overseeing the political process throughout Syria’s transition, regarding any UN role as an infringement on that sovereignty and an interference in Syria’s domestic affairs.
• The government’s desire to avoid the UN presence evolving into a large-scale mission like those in Iraq and Libya, which would cast the Syrian government in the same light as the governments of those two countries.
The government’s success in forming a new parliament and convening its inaugural session has bolstered its position regarding its ability to manage the political transition without international interference. Yet its stance on the UN’s political role demands that it accelerate the transitional phase, rather than waiting the five years stipulated in the interim Constitutional Declaration.
A shift in international positions within the Security Council, or a change in the Trump administration’s stance, could renew pressure on the Syrian government to accept a UN role in overseeing the political transition, including the drafting of a permanent constitution and the holding of general elections.