On June 14, demonstrations broke out in several parts of Syria, some marked by violence, as protesters demanded the arrest of Assad-era security and military officials accused of crimes during the country’s devastating civil war.
Although they only lasted a day, the protests stood out from other demonstrations in Syria in previous months. Significantly, they took place in areas that are theoretically strongholds of support for the new Syrian government. Moreover, their demands related not to livelihoods or public services, but to political and security issues.
The protestors sent a clear message: transitional justice has a security dimension, and cannot be addressed solely through political and social channels such as agreements with international actors or local elites, while neglecting legal and security measures that satisfy the families of victims. The demonstrations also highlighted that the alternative to such measures is vigilantism—such as in the district of Kafr Takharim in rural Idlib, where a former regime security operative was recently killed. Such acts of vengeance pose a growing threat to the peace, particularly if they spark reactions that risk escalating into confrontations along family, tribal, or sectarian lines.
The government’s handling of the process of transitional justice is marred by a lack of transparency. For instance, the families of victims and communities that suffered under the Assads have been offered no coherent explanations as to why certain prominent economic and social figures—such as businessmen Mohammed Hamsho, Fawaz al-Marsoumi and Nawaf al-Bashir—have not been brought to trial, despite their past financial, social, and security support for the former regime. This has fueled a public perception that Damascus prioritizes not transitional justice but political and economic considerations.
Other, related factors are also fueling public discontent. Chief among these is the failure to amend Assad-era laws, which are sometimes invoked to prosecute activists, and the failure to fully purge the judiciary of Assad-era judges. Taken together, all these factors are eroding public confidence in state institutions and the new government’s commitment to transitional justice.
Despite recent developments and mounting criticism of the government’s handling of the transitional justice file, Damascus retains the means to defuse public tension through a series of measures, should it choose to do so. These include restructuring the judiciary and conducting security operations in areas with high concentrations of former regime personnel, such as eastern Aleppo and the governorates of Deir ez-Zor and Al-Hasakah.
Furthermore, the government needs to be more transparent with the public regarding this issue, to prevent public opinion from being manipulated by potentially inaccurate leaks. Damascus must bolster confidence in its commitment to transitional justice, by increasing the role of the public and human rights organizations in the process.