On July 12, the Syrian parliament held its first session since the fall of the Assad regime. The gathering came nine months after indirect elections were held across most of the country, with results announced in early October last year. Yet this delay gave the state an opportunity to tackle various obstacles that could have caused problems with the structure, operations, and decision-making processes of the new People’s Assembly.
This includes the following measures:
• Holding indirect elections in the Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates following improvements in security conditions and administrative structures, rather than forming the legislature before such polls could take place—as was the case with the southern province of Suwayda. This helped broaden the assembly’s representative base, bolster its national legitimacy, and forestall contestation over whether it truly represents northeastern Syria, thereby providing the state with a more stable foundation for managing key political and social aspects of the transitional phase.
• Consolidating the Syrian state’s legal and political standing within international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as restoring its rights in bodies such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Furthermore, UN sanctions against President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Khattab have been lifted, as have most international sanctions against Syria, a process set to culminate soon in the removal of Syria from the U.S. Department of State’s list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”
• Breaking up all the country’s armed factions and integrating them into the state’s new military and security apparatuses—a process that effectively consolidated their weaponry under state control. This strengthened the legislature by ensuring that it was not beholden to armed force and would not face pressure to accept specific figures, quotas, or political agendas—issues that continue to plague parliaments in countries like Lebanon and Iraq.
• Implementing a deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and integrate them into government institutions. Given that the SDF had long pursued autonomy, a project that threatened Syria’s national unity, the state made a point of incorporating representatives to the assembly from the Al-Hasakah and Ayn al-Arab governorates. However, it has not sought a similar agreement over Suwayda, as the armed groups there have not championed a similar political agenda.
• Suspending the activities of political parties, particularly those that the Assad regime had granted control over Syria’s political life and exclusive rights to parliamentary representation. This move gave the assembly a key tool to avoid the kind of political polarization that often hinders post-war consensus-building, a common problem in countries like Lebanon and Iraq.
In summary, the Syria state has sought to balance popular representation with the political and security demands of the transitional period. It has taken steps to preempt the challenges that typically confront such bodies during transitions, thereby creating an opportunity for genuine transformation that meets the hopes of the Syrian public. It has also sought to pave the way for a political transition aligned with the international community’s demands of Syria, facilitating a timely conclusion to the post-war transition.