In mid-June, the U.S. and Iran began a 60-day period of negotiations aimed at finalizing terms for a settlement to halt the war between them. Both parties have started taking practical steps toward de-escalation, such as lifting restrictions on navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and U.S. efforts to contain Israel’s military operations in southern Lebanon.
Any settlement between Washington and Tehran is likely to have consequences not only for the two parties, but for the broader regional balance of power, including the situation in Syria. Contrary to the hopes of some Israelis, the Iranian regime has not completely collapsed. This will oblige the U.S. to continue to build regional arrangements and partnerships capable of containing and preventing the resurgence of Iran’s influence.
In this context, Syria stands out as a key arena for Washington to leverage in order to bolster regional stability and block Tehran from regaining its former influence, which stretched as far as the Eastern Mediterranean. Syria’s prominence is amplified by the difficulty of fully eliminating Iran’s influence in Iraq, and the complexities surrounding the disarmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Should the negotiations succeed in reaching a comprehensive agreement that addresses contentious issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran is likely to regain some of its political and economic capabilities as the pressure on it eases and a portion of its frozen assets is released. This would in turn reshape Syria’s regional environment, affecting both the balance of power and the nature of regional alignments and alliances.
Meanwhile, Damascus may find itself with greater room for maneuver in the face of Israeli pressure, perhaps reflected in President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s expressed readiness to engage in dialogue with Hezbollah, alongside indications that he has no issue with Iran provided it refrains from interfering in Syria.
However, this increased latitude for Damascus does not diminish anxiety in the region regarding the Iranian project. Tehran’s continued presence, albeit diminished, remains a significant factor in the calculations of regional states. From this perspective too, Syria will become increasingly important to the emerging regional axis that is seeking both to fill the vacuum left by Iran’s waning influence and to prevent that void from being filled by Israel.
These shifts could prompt Israel to take a more aggressive line on Syria. Netanyahu’s government might view growing Syrian-American ties, or a more prominent Syrian role in the region, as incompatible with its strategic interests. This could drive Israel to escalate its pressure or intensify its military and security actions on Syrian territory—whether for domestic political reasons, or from a desire to curb developments that clash with its own vision for regional security.
On the other hand, Washington’s growing reliance on Damascus may be accompanied by mounting pressure on Al-Sharaa’s government to assume broader security and other roles in the region. This could confront the Syrian government with additional challenges as it seeks to balance the demands of its emerging partnership with the U.S. against the need to maintain domestic stability. At the same time, if the U.S.-Iran pact succeeds, it could lead to a decline in American interest in certain regional issues. This could affect the level of U.S. support and engagement in Syria, or at least stymie further progress.
The extent to which Syria benefits from these shifts or suffers from their negative repercussions will depend largely on the Syrian government’s approach with regional developments. The more Damascus succeeds in expanding its political and regional influence through low-cost diplomatic and security tools, the greater its ability to mitigate potential risks will be. Conversely, direct military involvement in regional issues, particularly regarding Lebanon, could impose additional burdens on Syria’s stability and limit its gains.
Ultimately, the impact of the U.S.-Iranian agreement on Syria remains contingent on the nature of the understandings it entails, the scale of Tehran’s gains, Washington’s willingness to maintain its engagement in the Syrian file, and Syria’s own ability to leverage regional shifts to serve its national priorities—all while limiting the fallout of regional rivalries on its own territory.